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Abstract The purpose of this article is to discuss how best to finance higher education in
low-income countries of sub-Saharan Africa, drawing on benefits and drawbacks of the
prevalent models of higher education finance, and lessons to be learned from countries
which have seen greater expansion of their higher education systems in recent decades.
Two main aspects are distinguished: first, a recognition of the powerful evidence that the
general level of education in a country, its human capital, matters in determining a path to
economic development; second, understanding that it does not help to produce large
number of unemployed graduates whose only option due to absence of jobs is to engage in
rent-seeking activities which in the end undermine both the essence of the human capital
investment made, and job creation to be associated with human capital skills. Three areas
are discussed, fully publicly financed ‘‘free’’ university education model; feasibility and
lessons about fees; feasibility and lessons about loans. In addition, the paper makes sug-
gestions on the measures to widen participation and promote equity and quality.
Keywords Higher education funding  Higher education access  Higher education equity 
Higher education and development  Sub-Saharan Africa
Introduction
Much literature confirms theoretically through human capital theory and empirically
education’s importance to economic growth (Becker 1993; Mankiw et al. 1992; Barro
2000; Hanushek and Woessmann 2008). Any nation that aspires to develop and improve
the well-being of its citizens must therefore take its human capital investment seriously.
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However, the mechanism for this effect of human capital on growth is diverse ranging from
earnings, increased productivity, spill-over effects, to mention some of them (Keller 2006,
p. 18; Oketch et al. 2014). Because earnings accrue to individuals who have participated in
higher education and growth benefits entire society, this has generated much heat in the
debates about who should bear the responsibility for the investment in higher education.
These debates are common in high-income countries where endogenous growth models
(Lucas 1988) continue to advocate for greater benefits from higher education generated by
knowledge and innovation, but they have also generated heat in low-income countries
which must invest in advanced human capital for their own development advancement
sake (Oketch 2006) but also to function in a more globalised world. The case for devel-
opment, notwithstanding, higher education all over the world, in one way of another, is
paid for either by the taxpayer or individual students and their families. In some very few
instances, prospective employers may offer funding; however, all over the world, higher
education has become so expensive such that the debate today is much about which
funding model or combination is economically feasible and sensible, practical and moral,
within any given context. The recent riots by university students in South Africa over
proposed fees increase of about ten per cent demonstrate the dilemma over the rising cost
of higher education and who should pay for it.
The taxpayer-funded model seen as ‘‘free’’ can support effective but elite and small
number of universities, especially in trends with a focus on fiscal rigour. Calls for widening
participation are said to require greater diversification of funding or shifting costs to those
demanding higher education (Barr 2004). There are some exceptions to this globally,
especially in left-leaning Latin American countries such as Venezuela where there has
been a rapid state-funded expansion, though possibly with compromises on the quality of
provision. Thomas Muhr’s contribution to this special issue addresses the cases of
Venezuela and Brazil.
Authors such as McMahon agrees that in some cases, private funding is needed but a
sensible balance is necessary and points out that ‘‘…if control of higher education is to be
fully relinquished to private markets, then there needs to be analysis of the extent to which
there may be market failure leading to distortions’’ (McMahon 2009, p. 2). But what do
these debates on funding mean for higher education in sub-Saharan Africa countries which
have seen a shift in their economic growth measured by GPD from decades of stagnation or
negative growth to a much more positive outlook in recent years? For instance, in recent
years, the region has seen growth rates of GDP growth above the global average and higher
than advanced countries. This is unprecedented and has generated interest in the role of
higher education and the concept of youth dividend in the region’s development trajectory.
If taken as important for the sustained development of Africa, how then should higher
education be funded against competing demand for access and of resources for other
development goals? This has generated interest in the funding models that can work, how
and why?
This article serves to discuss the merits and challenges of the dominant models of higher
education funding in sub-Saharan Africa, setting out in an intertwined manner the eco-
nomic and moral considerations, and their implication for access and quality. The region
remains one of the economically poorest in the world with low levels of participation in
higher education; however, it has also recently seen widening participation in basic edu-
cation associated with the Education for All framework and the MDGs which prioritised
basic education and gender parity. This is putting pressure for access to both secondary and
higher levels of education. The traditional taxpayer-funded university model has come
under scrutiny and is considered both by governments and by liberal economists as
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unfeasible way for widening participation in this context. Furthermore, the original claim
to universities as essential for training much needed civil servants for nation building has
either been realised in some cases, or in others, is a less compelling argument. Therefore, a
claim to the need to build civil service is no longer a clear-cut justification to have
expanded ‘‘free’’ university education. Instead, governments are now calling for graduates
who can be ‘‘job creators’’. The phrase frequently used is ‘‘university graduates who are
entrepreneurs’’. However, there is less clarity on the philosophy of what this means for a
young person who has just completed his or her degree and facing a lengthy period of
unemployment. It is a signal that these governments in Africa want their universities but
are unsure of what to do with their graduates or how to engage them. Graduates are left to
their own devices to ‘‘create jobs’’.
Yet there is unprecedented demand, fuelled by youthful population in both rural and
urban areas who aspire to higher education and see it as their only means towards social
mobility, and a privileged urban minority who see university education as a normal passage
to adulthood and the world of work. Both of these groups have demanded and defended
‘‘free’’ university education: the former on equity and widening participation grounds
(aligned with social justice goals) and the latter on meritocracy and preservation of quality
grounds. These positions are not unique to sub-Saharan Africa. Such debates on how to
fund higher education and the role of loans and fees have occurred in the UK (see, e.g.
Greenaway and Hayness 2003) where higher education participation in terms of gross
enrolment ratio is about 60 % (UIS 2014) in contrast to sub-Saharan Africa where it is just
about 7 %. Since around mid-1990s, universities in several African countries have seen
profound funding reorganisation which introduced elements of private funding or complete
promotion of ‘‘entrepreneurial university’’. This reorganisation of funding and what it
means is the focus of the remainder of this paper, along with debates around ‘‘free’’ and
market funding models, and what these debates mean in Africa’s context.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, I present arguments justifying ‘‘free’’
university funding and relate these to Africa context. Second I discuss the actual funding
models, notably fees and loans. Third, I reflect on expanding access and responding to
demand, and finally I offer concluding discussion and thoughts on where higher education
funding in sub-Saharan Africa is headed in the context of sustainable development
aspirations.
Justifying ‘‘free’’ university education
State versus the market
The thrust of the arguments for or against either ‘‘free’’ or partial or full private market
funding models is about whether costs outweigh benefits (Woodhall 2001). In the devel-
oped countries such as the UK, much of the funding recent debate in higher education has
been both about value for money and about widening participation. This debate has been
triggered by the severe cuts into university funding in the last few years, with many courses
no longer receiving government subsidy and students required to make large contribution
to their education by way of tuition fees of £9000 per year which the government contends
is value for money and widens participation while critics disagree (Dearden et al. 2014). In
the low-income countries, notably sub-Saharan Africa, it is far much more than value for
money. There are both economic and moral arguments that have been made about whether
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widening participation through taxpayer funding model of ‘‘free’’ universities is justified
when there is no fully established provision for universal basic education. The question
often raised is why should the largely poor populations in sub-Saharan Africa be burdened
with university costs which their children have little chance of ever attending because they
do not have a chance of good basic education in the first place? The economic rate of return
(Psacharopoulos 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004) which has raised a lot of heat in
the debates about the role of higher education in development is often used as evidence to
illustrate that private benefits from higher education outweigh societal benefits.
Those who have questioned the rate of return premise have noted that good higher
education is part of good basic education (Teal 2011) meaning that it is never clear-cut to
separate which part of the connection between education and economic development is due
to basic education and which one is purely as a result of higher education investment. This
implies that where schools are homogenised by pupils’ socio-economic backgrounds, the
schools that produce university ‘‘material’’ would be those which are mainly accessed by
those from wealthy socio-economic backgrounds. Whatever the case, the rate of return
argument won the case several years ago and has been cited in calls for greater diversi-
fication of funding and a shift in the university funding models away from purely taxpayer-
funded model to those models whereby costs are pushed to wealthy students who are
demanding higher education or where this is politically difficult there has been calls for
greater sharing of higher education costs between taxpayers and the student and their
families (Johnstone 1998; Oketch 2003). However, McMahon (2009, p. 2) has noted that
the problem is that although families and students are conversant with the increases in
earnings, a purely market benefit associated with acquiring higher education, they are often
‘‘only very vaguely aware of the value of non-market benefits beyond earnings that
enhance the quality of life’’. As McMahon further points out, these private non-market
benefits are hugely important as they are generated by a graduate’s use of his or her human
capital at home and in the community when they are not at work or sleeping, and the
productivity of this time is enhanced greatly as a result of their higher education. In the
end, there are benefits to the individual graduate’s private well-being as well as benefits to
others in the community and to future generations (McMahon 2009, p. 118/119). These
private non-market benefits include: better own health, better child health, better spousal
health, greater longevity, small family size, and increased happiness (also see McMahon
and Oketch 2013, Table 2, p. 93). So the true benefits of higher education to the individual
are narrowly conceived and understood if restricted to earnings only, and in the end
funding policies guided purely by rate of return discourse does not produce higher edu-
cation that embodies the framework of higher education’s contribution to sustainable
development. It perpetuates inequality in opportunity for access to and outcomes from
higher education, especially in poor countries with high levels of corruption and inequality,
even though it shifts costs away from governments to wealthy students and their families.
Higher education is a basic right and should therefore be free
As Barr (2004) notes, this is value judgement which ‘‘commands widespread agreement’’ (p.
266). Its foundation is equity (see e.g. McCowan (2012) discussion on ‘‘a universal right to
higher education’’). According to Barr, ‘‘equity objective is not free higher education, but a
system in which no bright person is denied a place because he or she comes from a disad-
vantaged background’’ (p. 266). This is complex in low-income countries of sub-Saharan
Africa where primary and secondary education already disadvantages majority, a point also
highlighted byMcCowan (2012) when he notes that ‘‘the task of ensuring equitable access is
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highly challenging in contemporary societies given the entrenched inequalities stemming
from educational experiences prior to university entry’’ (p. 125). Those bright persons who
would have demonstrated their potential but have no chance of demonstrating it at basic
education level are in the majority. How then should a ‘‘rights approach’’ be implemented in
such a context? The fundamental point that Barr raises is that when people talk about a free
higher education, the consideration is to make ‘‘higher education free at the point of use’’.
There are several arrangements that have been set out to make this possible and which I
discuss in the sections that will follow later. The question is their feasibility and lessons
learned from actual implementation in relation to access and quality.
Other justifications
Several other justifications for free or highly subsidised higher education appear in the
literature. The idea of positive externalities (McMahon 2009; Keller 2006) is one of them.
This is the notion that higher education benefits are captured by those who have not them-
selves attended higher education, but there are also several other private social benefits such
as better own health which were ignored by rate of return estimates (McMahon and Oketch
2013). Critics of the externalities argument claim it does not suggest subsidising students at
exactly the same rate (Rosen 1995; Fernandez and Rogerson 1995). Instead the positive
externality argument supports subsidies that would encourage university education for bright
individuals who left on their own may not invest the time needed in their studies in order to
qualify for university education (Rozada and Menendez 2002).
Another argument that lends support for ‘‘free’’ or subsidised higher education relates to
the ‘‘pathways’’ of higher education’s impact to development framework (Oketch et al.
2014), which underpins higher education’s integral contribution to an entire education
system, and also the rule of law often so fundamental to proper functioning not only of
society, but of its education as well. The rule of law is crucial because where it exists, the
school system will tend to function well, with teachers who are accountable and schools
that tend to be better managed. When higher education is neglected, this affects basic
education. The manpower needed to strengthen basic education through teachers, and
teacher training, are products of higher education. The lawyers needed for a functional
judicial justice systems are products of higher education, and the process of democrati-
sation has been empirically linked to higher education (Keller 2006). The policy and
research needed to support the advancement and improvements in the provision and quality
of basic education, and thus equity and social justice, are associated with skills acquired
mainly through higher education. Therefore, neglecting higher education is perilous to
basic education in any context and perilous to social justice in any context.
Nevertheless, the above are not the reasons why there is now resurgence in interest in
higher education in sub-Saharan Africa. The role that the market can play or has already
played is certainly one of them. Connected to this are several other driving forces such as
unprecedented demand associated with prior high population growth rates; concerns over
quality which would have later impact on labour market and productivity; acceptance
about looking keenly at the alternative funding models that can support rapid demand or an
attitude by governments that higher education can simply fund itself; and expansion in
democratic space itself partly as a result of higher education, and consequently the election
of political leaders who are not overly threatened or paranoid about a more educated
population who can challenge or satirise their leadership excesses through the media. I
should say here that this is not generalised: the flip side are leaders who have weakened the
university system such that those acquiring degrees have limited critical intellectual capital
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to challenge political leadership. Flooding universities which produce graduates who are
not readily employable may be seen as ‘‘development’’ by some political leaders.
Opposition to the notion of a ‘‘free’’ university funding model
Barr (2004) is among the staunch advocates of a system that is not entirely free. He says
free higher education is bad for access. But he also has a moral conscience in his writing
against free higher education when he notes that it is not only ‘‘immoral’’ to charge for
education in contexts whereby. … ‘‘people with the aptitude and desire are denied access
to higher education because they cannot afford it; it is also immoral if underfunded earlier
education means that they never even aspire to university’’ (Barr 2004, p. 266). Then he
goes on to note that these arguments do not apply to suggestions of making food free so
why should they apply to higher education? Here I ask how would Barr’s argument of
‘‘free is bad for access’’ be reflected in the context of sub-Saharan Africa? The evidence
seems to support his argument. There has been unprecedented expansion since the higher
education sector was liberalised around mid-1990s. Over the last decade, in some coun-
tries, universities have emerged overnight, almost more than a dozen per year. Countries
such as Kenya have seen mind-boggling growth from a handful of universities about a
decade ago to around 100 today. This is repeated in the neighbouring Uganda, across in
West Africa in Nigeria and Ghana. I will come to the challenges associated with this rapid
growth later, but to respond to Barr, it is presumable that there has to be a threshold at
which the ‘‘free’’ is bad for access starts, and presumably, this is also associated with the
macro-economic context. Yet the discourse on higher education finance has often ignored
to discuss a threshold on the context-specific dimensions of cost-sharing.
In sub-Saharan Africa context with less than adequate level of participation in higher
education (averaging about 6 %) even though universities have opened quite rapidly in
recent years in some countries, it cannot be said that the free is ‘‘bad’’ for access threshold,
assuming this threshold exists, has been reached. It is therefore necessary to debate and
reflect on the role of the private market vis-a-vis that of the state and to not promote a
government attitude that is in support of the notion that ‘‘free is bad for access’’. This can
be detrimental to equity and meaningful development of higher education. The market has
a role, but in situations of low participation, access has to be the role of the government, in
ensuring that higher education is accessible and does not cheat students and their families
by producing graduates who have only marginal aptitudes beyond those who have com-
pleted good basic education. There are examples of bad access as a result of both state and
market principles of funding higher education (see e.g. Heyneman et al. 2008, discussion
on corruption in higher education in Eastern Europe). Furthermore, it would be pointless to
expand access, even under the market system which produces graduates who are unable to
think critically, communicate effectively, and unlikely to be numerate to the level expected
of a university graduates. Such systems cheat students and their families. A country that
has under 5 % cohort enrolment and is not as large as China or India, may have to seriously
question the idea that free university education is bad for access, but at the same time it has
to be careful not to expand university that produces graduates that its economic system is
not ready to utilise or lack skills that are associated with university graduates. Universities
are poor at producing the so-called entrepreneurs in large scale, so if this is the model that
is required, then considerations could be directed to apprenticeships.
The second key argument advanced by Barr is ‘‘elitism’’, and he rightly points out that
elitism should have no place in higher education. The thrust of this argument is that ‘‘social
background per se should not influence access to the best universities’’ (Barr p. 266).
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However, the rejoinder that Barr has is that intellectual elitism should not be an issue of
concern. The challenge in sub-Saharan Africa is how to separate the two when intellectual
elitism is intertwined with socio-economic class of children way below at primary level,
and the meritocratic method of selection into universities reinforces this.
In the end, these two tenets, moral argument and elitism, are complex in sub-Saharan
Africa. The debate about how best to fund higher education may not be as simply trans-
ferrable from one context to another as Barr has suggested. This complexity has created
some of the serious challenges with the funding models that were proposed by the World
Bank and adopted by countries in sub-Saharan Africa under the demand management
policies of the 1980s. In the next sections, I will discuss some of these funding models and
highlight concerns with their implementation through several examples which I will
mention.
Models of funding
Fees-supported funding model and access
Over the last decade, many more students have gained access to university in sub-Saharan
Africa, more than quadrupling enrolment in some cases, and there has also been consid-
erably greater diversity in the offerings of many higher education institutions in terms of
courses and the types of universities available. As noted by UNESCO Institute of Statistics
(UIS 2010, p. 1) ‘‘Enrolment in tertiary education grew faster in sub-Saharan Africa than
any other region over the last four decades. While there were fewer than 200,000 tertiary
students enrolled in the region in 1970, this number soared to over 4.5 million in 2008—a
more than 20-fold increase’’. This rapid expansion is illustrated by Fig. 1. Categories now
include traditional (older) universities, newer state universities, and a proliferation of
private universities. These changes for some are welcome because they are associated with
the introduction of fees and a move away from dominance of ‘‘free’’ university to the
involvement of the market in higher education, whereas for others, they have commodified
education and affected quality seriously.
Fees have come in the form of meeting the full economic cost or through what is
referred to as cost-sharing whereby students meet the partial cost of their university
education while the government pays for the rest. Initially, there were protests when tuition
fees were first seriously introduced in the 1990s in countries such as Kenya, Ghana,
Uganda, but today fees have somewhat become increasingly accepted as necessary for
access and to redress underfunding amidst greater demand. The concern is that govern-
ments have more or less taken a back seat in so far as funding is concerned, expecting
universities to find their own sources for effective funding, but this has meant that uni-
versities rely on student tuition fees at the expense of good student learning experience and
research by academics who have to undertake heavy teaching generated by large classes.
All public universities in East Africa, notably Kenya and Uganda, and in West Africa,
notably Ghana, now run what is called ‘‘dual-track model’’ whereby a small number of
students are enrolled on state funding and another group, usually twice or more the number
on state funding, are enrolled to pay the full economic cost on their own. Universities have
found a way to maximise the benefits from this because the infrastructure used by fully
subsidised and full-fee-paying students is the same. In addition, they have contracted staff
who have already been contracted to teach fully subsidised students, leading to a situation
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of double-dipping in universities. By 1999, Makerere had perfected this by moving from a
situation where none of its students paid any direct tuition fees to one whereby 70 % paid
fees (Court 1999). Today, full-fee-paying students at Makerere University in Uganda are in
far greater number than those whose tuition fees is subsidised by the government. Nairobi
University in Kenya and Kenyatta University also in Kenya followed suit in the footsteps
of Makerere and similarly enrol many more students who are self-sponsored than those
funded by the government. These universities such as Makerere, Nairobi, Kenyatta have
become transformed for better or worse, depending on how one looks at fees, such that
they are now ‘‘enterprises’’ with claims of flexible resources and reduced reliance on the
state for their survival. The question is often whether true learning can occur with such
large number of students. The perception is that quality has deteriorated and universities
have over-done the ‘‘dual-track’’ funding model. Instead of complementing government
resources, fees have in real terms increasingly displaced government funding, a valuable
result that has also been observed by Carpentier (2012) in the UK. Teaching work load has
been increased leaving little breadth for research. In these countries, such as Uganda and
Kenya, there is no political debate that tuition is prohibitive. As a result of tuition-based
expansion through the dual-track parallel model, universities are said to have invested
heavily in infrastructure, some of which are not well planned and less clearly geared
towards addressing immediate quality challenges, and salaries to staff who have to hop
from one college campus to another to teach. Little is known about how this is leading to
greater socio-economic homogenisation of universities and higher education, whereby
Fig. 1 What are the long-term trends for participation in tertiary education? Source reproduced from UIS
2010
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those who access university are those able to pay for it, and it is possible the quality of
higher education they are receiving is not completely what they deserve.
Loans dependent model
Loans are a feature of university funding all over the world (Ziderman 2002), although
there are those who have argued that such loans add to student debt upon their graduation
(see, e.g. Callender and Jackson 2008 for the case of England). Loans tend to have the
following advantages: they increase access to higher education; they make the richer
students to contribute to university budget; they increase the seriousness of students
towards their studies and thus minimise or eliminate dropout; and they are considered a fair
way of expanding higher education. However, whether loan is a feasible way of expanding
access and maintaining quality in low-income countries is arguable. In countries such as
the USA, loan is a way of life and students accept that, and most recently in the UK, it has
grudgingly been accepted as the way to realise 50 % participation rate. In these countries,
students take loans and will pay it back. Their government are concerned with how to keep
graduate unemployment low, and in the case of the UK, at what level of income should
repayment start and after how long should outstanding balances be written off. These are
big debate issues of serious political and economic considerations. The aim of such models
as in UK is to promote equality of opportunity and equality of outcome such that someone
who starts poor but ends up very rich pays more than someone who starts poor but ends up
less rich. It also makes it possible for someone poor and someone rich to have equal access
at the point of use. This according to Barr is fair to society and everyone (Barr 2004).
In Africa, student loans have been rushed without considering their complexity and
context, and in the end, these loans have had several problems which have commonly been
identified in the literature. They have narrowly calculated returns on investment(Colclough
and Lewin 1993); a wanting credit market and the poor management of these loans (Arrow
1993); high non-repayment rate and a lack of effective system to track down on the
defaulters, and in places where the default rate is so high, it is pointless to call it a loan
(Tilak 1992). Other problems include high cost associated with the administration of these
loans in the first place, in some instances as high as 20 % of the overall loan amount; and
there is less clarity and agreement on who should be the lender. Governments simply do
not have enough resources to lend students, and banks are unwilling to agree to anything
with uncertain governments that can change quickly and a culture of accountability that is
less than adequate (Oketch 2003).
Presently, there are no clear debates about what kind of loan scheme is feasible in Africa
as those that have existed have simply been tinkered with and the recovery is minimal.
Income-contingent loans sound appropriate, but they would also require that there is
serious debate about university graduate employment opportunities. It would be pointless
to expand loan-fuelled demand for university education with graduates who in the end do
not have employment opportunities. This will create a supply driven funding that is not
matched with the demand for the degrees produced and a dilution of human capital. But
eventually loans are essential, particularly if the idea of university expansion is well
thought out and well designed to grow with the economic need and not simply as a
response to popular demand and political statement. As Johnstone (1998) noted, loans
defer the expected student financial contribution to their university education and thus ease
the burden at the point of use. But loans that simply become grant because of the chal-
lenges which have been highlighted above will not expand access to those who, otherwise,
will find it difficult to go to university. The key to a functional loan is to reasonably shift
High Educ (2016) 72:525–539 533
123
some cost of higher education to the student, and to achieve this, there has to be an
effective recovery mechanism (Johnstone et al. 1998). As Johnstone (1998) points out, an
effective loan scheme is one that on the balance of things promotes access at a cost to the
government than would have otherwise been possible through a grant or ‘‘free’’ university
system. If this is not feasible via loans, then the economic and moral arguments about loans
become contested.
If taken that loans should work to promote access, how should they look like in the
context in sub-Saharan Africa? Firstly, loans have to be reasonably affordable. It makes no
sense for high interest and expensive loans that saddle beneficiaries with debts that they
cannot possibly repay in contexts of low wages and low employment; it is about managing
expectation given the economic context. This requires that the macro-economic environ-
ment is thoughtfully considered as part of the loan equation model. Secondly, loans may
need to be portable which would mean that in the context of diversified offering of
university education, admission to university is made flexible to suit the needs of the
students. It is argued that such loans offer the freedom for poor students who meet uni-
versity entry requirement to go to universities which are high cost or highly selective as
they will not ex-ante be put off by unaffordable means to university, thus demotivating
them to put in the extra effort required to meet the admission criteria for such selective
institutions. Thirdly, loans should be sufficient to cover the full cost of university education
including acceptable personal expenses such as room and board, clothing, etc. When loans
are inadequate, they affect students learning and fail to serve their purpose (Oketch 2003).
One of the good things associated with income-contingent loans is that it appeals to social
justice because it has both the element of equal opportunity and fair sharing of repayment
burden. It is not a one pair of shoes fits all model that is currently prevalent in some of the
few loan schemes that exist in Africa. As Oketch (2003, p. 102) noted, ‘‘student loans can
be a lifeline but a slippery one. The trick [is] to find a balance between providing subsidies
to needy students, and making loan programmes financially sustainable’’. The same token
applies to fees which have clearly shown that they can revitalise the higher education in
some aspects.
Expanding access and responding to demand
The model of funding is crucial in the expansion of access and responding to demand for
higher education in sub-Saharan Africa. However, ‘‘information’’ is equally as important,
including raising awareness among those who otherwise do not see university as meant for
them. Some of the ways by which the poor can be targeted include income-tested grants;
giving money to universities to support scholarships for students from poor backgrounds;
and incentives that promote aspiration for university education among the most under-
represented population groups. These will require clear legislation and policy debate.
There is evidence that private financing can meet demand and support to a degree, self-
functioning universities. The fears that were common in the first wave of the introduction
of ‘‘private funding’’ have now been overcome as there is now an acceptance that some
reliance on private finance is essential. Some of the positive things that have occurred as a
result of the dual-track model include competitive courses, reduced violent riots by stu-
dents over trivial issues, and wasteful idle facilities which were common place when
students were sent home on long holidays. Campuses in some countries no longer close
because of the dual-track model. The students who pay the full cost do not want to overstay
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their years at university because this adds cost to their education (Oketch 2003). As Oketch
notes, ‘‘in the past, [when university was considered ‘‘free’’], this did not matter to many
students.
To summarise, flexible tuition [fees] supported by income-contingent loans redistribute
from today’s richer population who lose a fraction of their tuition subsidies to enable
greater numbers of less rich and poor students to gain a place at the university, who with
income-contingent loans, do not have to pay the full cost if they do not secure reasonable
employment. There is no known African country that clearly has this model, and the UK
has been experimenting with it. To a larger extent, this is a great contract between a
government and all sections of its population. On the one hand, the student is assured of a
place without charges at the point of use, and on the other, a government must worry about
the management of the economy and conducive political economy environment that can
help generate employment for the graduates, who, in turn, repay their loans. This can be
said to be a reasonable redistributive programme if implemented with equity and quality in
mind and well. The setback is that loan schemes have not been implemented well in Africa
and the macro-economic context has instead generated inefficiencies in higher education
through graduate unemployment. In addition, fees can work, if managed properly such that
they are not excessive and poorly invested on less important and less immediate priorities
for addressing quality teaching and learning. We have seen this with the rapid expansion of
the dual-track models. These dual-track models have enabled the government and uni-
versities, in some instances to literally kill two birds with one stone: expand access through
evening programmes which do not affect the regular students, while also providing uni-
versities with resources to redress their dilapidated conditions and expand facilities. The
problem now faced in several countries is that universities are over-doing it such that
quality has become an issue of major concern.
Therefore, the question that should now be asked is what is the appropriate level of
implementation of the dual-track programme? And should this be a government decision or
should it be left to the higher education institutions (HEIs) and their management? The
trend and practice thus far has left it to HEIs and their management to decide, but there is
also now growing concern over quality and excessive expansion of these dual-track pro-
grammes which has called into question the judgement of HEIs and their managers. In
some cases, such as in Kenya recently the government has stepped into discuss a frame-
work that can regulate excessive and perverse incentives for dual-track programme
expansion. An ideal scenario should be one whereby the market is left to function semi-
autonomously but with clear government regulatory framework which could include a cap
on the level of expansion that is expected for each category of university, and heavy
penalty for those HEIs which excessively expand and undermine the quality of university
education.
Discussion and conclusion
There is resurgence of interest in research and understanding of the role of higher edu-
cation in the development of the low-income countries (Oketch et al. 2014) and policy is
focused on two main issues: promoting access and improving quality. Both are funda-
mental for development in SSA. As Oketch (2003, p. 91) noted, ‘‘the access objective is
important both for its own sake and because Africa has the lowest enrolments in higher
education compared to other regions of the world’’. The quality objective is vital in a world
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where knowledge has become increasingly important for economic growth. ‘‘Achieving
both objectives is dependent on financial resources available to higher education’’ (Oketch
2003, p. 91). Several positive things that are associated with higher education such as
producing competent civil servants are necessary for effective running of government
responsibilities, individuals with the capacity to manage businesses, enterprise, and pro-
fessional fields such as law and banking. Other benefits include traction for foreign direct
investment, research and development, adaptation of new knowledge in context and so
forth. Recent trends towards democratisation and the forging of national identity are often
associated with higher education. All these are good reasons why any government might
see it necessary to provide ‘‘free’’ higher education to its population. Similarly, these
reasons have been used by those who advocate for publicly funded higher education, as
they are conceived to convey the message of greater good of higher education to society.
But these debates are relatively easy when the macro-economic environment is positive.
When there is dismal economic performance, the competing demands for resources tend to
shift the focus away from higher education.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the situation was so bad that most universities were simply
dilapidated shells of what they once were; examples included Makerere University in
Uganda. Recently, due to different funding models, things have improved. In universities
such as Kenyatta University in Kenya, infrastructure has improved a lot though there are
reports that it is still inadequate to meet fully the standards of quality learning. Lecture
halls still overflow beyond levels considered conducive for meaningful effective learning
in some cases. Today, however, the pessimistic picture of the African university once
described by Coombe (1991) of complete dilapidation is no longer fully applicable nor is it
a true depiction of the African university. Neave’s ‘‘things fall apart’’ analogy in his
description in his writing about higher education in Africa (Neave 2003) is also not
applicable today in several cases. There is much hope and enthusiasm injected by the
diversified funding models. There are still some challenges such as faculty who hustle for
additional income by hoping from one campus to another to teach or running individually
contracted consultancies rather cheaply outside the university, libraries are low in books
and journals, but there is also now greater access through agreements such as HINERA
network that allows African universities greater access to journal materials electronically
or at highly subsidised costs and sometimes free access. Generally, physical facilities are
improving at some of the key universities in Africa mainly because the idea of centrally
planned university which led to their formation in the 1970s has given way to a diversified
enterprise model whereby universities are no longer tied to price control, quantity control,
and a bureaucratic quality control (see, e.g. Barr 2004 for the case of the UK). African
universities have implemented new solutions which has reduced reliance on state funds.
There is evidence that private funding has revitalised higher education in sub-Saharan
Africa and enabled universities to accommodate excess demand but as Oketch (2003,
p. 104) points out the desirability of private funding and determining what constitutes an
acceptable level remains a formidable issue that requires to be debated and addressed by
African governments. At the same time, there is nothing wrong with elite model and
provision so long as there are also other provisions of tertiary education that are not
considered elite. Elite alongside non-elite would be viable. Serious consideration under a
‘‘free’’ university funding model has to be directed towards finding ways of supporting
bright students from disadvantaged backgrounds. In addition, publicly financed model has
to have a very clear way of linking higher education to employability of the graduates;
otherwise, it is pointless to produce graduates who have nothing to do in the economy and
who soon use their knowledge to create rent-seeking cartels. This has led to entrenched
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corruption in some countries. Rather than spread funding thinly to many institutions
through rapid expansion, it is better to restrict funding to few institutions based on present
needs but which produce productive graduates with multiplier effect in the labour market.
Furthermore, as growth occurs and the society becomes wealthy, there would be nothing
wrong to consider greater private finance. As put by McMahon, ‘‘how far the trend toward
privatization should go depends primarily on the extent to which higher education gen-
erates social benefits that are above and beyond private benefits to the student and his or
her family. Sometimes this issue generates more heat than light. The position at one
extreme is that higher education programs should be privatized and forced to cover their
full costs, otherwise they will not be efficient. At the other extreme is the position that the
market should have no role whatsoever, that the academy should be exempt’’ (McMahon
2009, pp. 11–12). These debates are ongoing in Africa as well. However, ‘‘for one thing,
there are sources of market failure in higher education markets that cause fully privatised
markets to be inefficient. For example, there is poor information about what the non-
market private benefits really are and also about specifically what the public benefits are.
Where there is poor information, private markets fail, and the result is economic ineffi-
ciency. In contrast, there is relatively good information about the contribution of a college
education to earnings’’ (McMahon 2009, p. 13). For higher education to position itself
towards playing meaningful role in sustainable development in Africa, there will need to
be a balance on the extent to which the market model can be allowed to prevail. In the end,
the state will have to play a key role in terms of both setting up functional regulatory
frameworks to safeguard quality, and to support university access through greater funding
in order to strengthen equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.
Future research on cost-sharing
Research into the mechanisms for financing of higher education in sub-Saharan Africa
which can deliver expanded access, quality and equity will depend and largely draw on a
framework of the macro-economic context, demographic shift, demand and supply, and the
regulatory framework for delivering and managing sustainable quality higher education in
the region. There is no doubt that there will be implications for theoretical analysis on the
role of the market versus that of the state, issues around possible market failure, as well as
issues around non-market benefits of higher education drawing particularly on the
endogenous development theorising and the sustainable development aspirations vis-a vis
cost-sharing. The evidence available indicates that there is room for some level of private
funding which has been associated with expanded participation in some countries, but there
has also been concern over the effect of this rapid expansion funded through entrepre-
neurial activities of the universities on quality. The renewed interest in higher education’s
role in the development of sub-Saharan Africa is welcome news, but a focus on under-
standing the connection between different funding models with quality and equity would
be more immediate areas for both theorising and empirical research work on cost-sharing.
Only limited amount could be said about actual loans that are in operation now because
there is limited research in this area, and progress in the understanding of the kinds of loan
schemes that could work to expand access in Africa would require research attention.
Probably, a more immediate research and equally as important is employability of uni-
versity graduates, because this will shed some light on the external efficiency of these
universities, which has implications for cost-sharing policies.
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